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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case N|o. 880062-CA

vs.
Priority 2

JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OEf CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal tfrom an order
suppressing evidence in a case charging defendant with a second
degree felony.

This Court has jurisdictiort to hear this appeal

under Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-26(c)(5) (19$2) and 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is the validity of the initial stop of defendant

irrelevant where defendant consented to th£ subsequent search of
his truck?
2.

Was the stop of defendant by a highway patrolman

with 21 years of experience for following Another vehicle too
closely on Interstate 15 merely a pretext JEor an investigative
search?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized,
Utah Constitution, art. I § 14:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 15, 1987 Highway Patrol Trooper Paul
Mangelson was driving southbound on Interstate 15 at about 4:00
p.m. when he observed defendant's truck driving northbound near
Nephi (R. 50). Mangelson may have observed that defendant's
truck displayed out of state license plates (R. 50). He did
observe that defendant was following the vehicle in front of him
at a distance of about 3 or 4, possibly 5 carlengths and he felt
that distance was unsafe (R. 51).
Mangelson turned through the median and pulled up to
defendant's truck (R. 51, 52). Pulling alongside defendant,
Mangelson estimated defendant's speed at approximately 50 miles

-2-

per hour (R. 5 1 ) A

At that time, Mangelson also observed that

defendant appeared to be Hispanic (R. 52). Because Mangelson
still felt defendant was following too closejLy, he pulled
defendant over (R. 53) •
Mangelson issued a citation to defendant for following
too closely and for driving on an expired driver's license (R.
5)*

At some point, defendant consented to Mfrngelson's subsequent

search of the truck (R. 5 3 ) . 2 Mangelson disbovered approximately
one kilogram of cocaine inside the passenger door panel.

He

arrested defendant for possession of a controlled substance (R.
6).
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over
to District Court on the narcotics charge (1^. 1-3) .

Defendant

moved to suppress the cocaine as evidence claiming that
Mangelson's traffic stop was pretextual for an investigative
search of defendant's truck (R. 12-13).

Juc^ge Harding granted

the motion to suppress and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and an Order suppressing the evidence on January 6, 1988
(R. 49-55).

* Judge Harding found that Mangelson estimated the speed at 50
miles per hour even though Mangelson testified that it was 50 to
55 and defendant said he was travelling 54 failes per hour (T.
169, 192, 195).
2 Defendant conceded that he consented to the search, therefore,
no details were presented after the facts surrounding the initial
stop. Defendant challenged only the initial stop (R. 53, T.
189) .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court found that defendant consented to the
search of his vehicle and yet it suppressed the evidence
discovered in that search finding that the search was pretextual*
The decision to suppress the evidence was erroneous because
defendant's consent vitiated any prior illegality of the stop
where defendant essentially conceded that the consent was
voluntary and did not result from the alleged illegality of the
initial stop.
Alternatively, the stop was lawful because the officer
observed a traffic violation for which he ticketed defendant.
Therefore, the stop was not a mere pretext for an investigative
search.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VALIDITY OF THE STOP WAS IRRELEVANT WHERE
DEPENDANT CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS
TRUCK.
Defendant argued below, and the trial court held, that
Trooper Mangelson's stop of defendant for "following too close"
was merely a pretext for an investigative search.

The lower

court found also that defendant consented to the search (F.F.
#18) .^

Indeed, when the State attempted to present evidence

concerning the issue of consent, defendant objected claiming that
he challenged only the validity of the stop (T. 189).
Essentially, defendant conceded that the search was consensual
but claims that his consent was irrelevant where he alleged
3 "F.F." refers to the Findings of Fact, attached as Appendix A.
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pretext for the initial stop.

Because this was a consent search,

the lower court improperly suppressed the evidence.
In State v. Valdez, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, (Utah Dec. 28,
1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that it need not consider the
validity of a search warrant where there was valid consent to
search the premises.

Similarly, in this case, this Court need

not consider the validity of the initial stop where defendant
consented to the search of his truck.
The cases defendant relied upon below to argue
otherwise do not, in fact, support his position.

In both State

v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) and State )v. Rice, 717 P.2d 695
(Utah 1986), the searches challenged were inventory searches of
impounded vehicles, the validity of which hanged upon the
validity of the impoundment, not upon the validity of the initial
stops.

In both cases, the searches were found to be pretextual

because the officers did not follow established police procedures
when impounding the vehicles and the impoundments were not
justified.

In neither case did the State attempt to justify the

search based upon consent of the defendant.
Quite dissimilarly, in this case, the validity of the
search did not rest upon the actions of the officer or any
observations made by him because of the sto$> but rested solely
upon defendant's voluntary consent to the search of his vehicle.
Defendant chose to waive his fourth amendment and Article I § 14
rights even though he could have refused to allow the search.
Had defendant refused the search, there is no evidence a search
would have occurred since there was no probable cause established
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for the search and t h e r e was no claim t h a t defendant's truck
would have been impounded for the minor t r a f f i c

violations

initially cited.
Nor does State v. Mendoza, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah
Dec. lr 1987) support defendant's claim that an invalid stop
invalidates a consent search.

The search of Mendoza's vehicle

was made after he was arrested by INS officers for being an
illegal alien.

Mendoza did not consent to the search.

In fact, the State is unable to locate any cases where
a pretext claim was allowed to successfully invalidate a
subsequent consent search.

The pretext cases have been limited

to searches based upon a defective impound or a claimed search
incident to arrest or plain view discovery all of which depend
for their validity upon the validity of the initial intrusion
upon the defendant's constitutional rights.

See generally W.

LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 7.5(e) (2d ed. 1987).

In these

types of cases, the officer predicates the search upon an arrest
for a minor offense where he would normally have only issued a
citation at the scene.
Consent searches do not depend for their validity upon
the legality of prior police conduct so long as the consent is
voluntarily given.

Moran v. Burbine,

U.S.

,

, 106 S.

Ct. 1135, 1141-42 (1986) ("The state of mind of the police is
irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness
of [defendant's] election to abandon his rights.").

The focus in

a consent search case is the defendant's grant of consent and not
the request to search or the reasons underlying it.
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"rVIoluntarv

consent, as defined for Fourth Amendment purposes, is an
intervening act free of police exploitation i>f the primary
illegality and is sufficiently distinguishable from the primary
illegality to purge the evidence of the primary taint."

United

States v. Carson. 793 F.2d 1141f 1147-48 (lOfch Cir- 1986) cettt
denied 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986).

Se& also United States v. Fallon,

457 F.2d 15, 20 (10th Cir. 1972) (while evidence would

not have

been obtained had defendant not been stopped, "but for" factual
connection not sufficient to render evidence inadmissible);
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985)
(defendant's voluntary consent removes any t^int of prior illegal
seizure of defendant).
The lower court's finding that the allegedly pretextual
stop invalidated defendant's consent flies in the face of the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Wongi Sun v. United
States* 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Wong Sun state|d:

We need not hold that all evidence is
"fruit of the poisonous tree" simdly because
it would not have come to light bi^t for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case ^s "whether,
granting establishment of the priniary
illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality orj instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint."
Id. at 487-88 (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit held in Carson that "'exploitation of
the primary illegaility' means that the police use the fruits of
the primary illegality to coerce defendant into granting his
consent."

793 F.2d at 1148 (emphasis in original).
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Even if the

police request to search is unreasonabler it is irrelevant to the
grant of consent unless consent is involuntarily given,

I&. at

1148-49.
In this case, defendant conceded that he consented to
the search and never challenged the voluntariness of his consent.
Indeed, he argued that his consent was irrelevant and convinced
the judge to exclude evidence of his consent.

Effectively, then,

he conceded that his consent was voluntary and the court found
that defendant consented to the search.^

Because defendant

consented to the search, this Court should reverse the trial
court's suppression of the evidence and need not consider the
validity of the stop.
POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, THE INITIAL STOP WAS FOR A
VALID TRAFFIC OFFENSE AND WAS NOT A MERE
PRETEXT FOR AH INVESTIGATIVE SEARCH.
Even if this Court were to find that defendant's
consent did not vitiate any prior illegality, it can still find
that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.

The stop

here was predicated on an observed traffic offense and was not
pretextual regardless of the officer's state of mind.

Utah Code

Ann. § 41-6-62 (1953) makes it illegal for a driver to follow
more closely than is reasonable and prudent, with regard to the
conditions of the road and the traffic driving on it.

Officer

Mangelson testified that when he saw the defendant, his truck was
* Notably, defendant prepared the Findings, Conclusions and Order
entered by the court that contain this finding (R. 49-55), see
Appendix A.
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no more than three to five carlengths behind the car ahead of
him, at approximately 50 to 55 miles per houiU
Under Utah Code Ann. § 27-10-4 (19$3) , the highway
patrol has the responsibility to enforce
the road and regulate traffic.

the laws and rules of

Contrary to the defendant's

assertion that the stop was a pretext designed only to allow a
search, the patrolman issued a citation to defendant, finding him
in violation of the law's injunction against following too
closely.
Officer Mangelson determined that defendant violated
the law by observing his vehicle and pulling alongside to
determine his approximate speed.

Because th£ officer observed

the defendant's driving and found he was following too closely,
the stop was not a pretext for a search but an attempt to
regulate traffic and enforce the laws of Utah.

Even if the

officer entertained an improper motive for t^ie stop, that alone
does not invalidate the stop so long as it w|as also based upon
the observation of a traffic violation; i.e., that it was an
objectively reasonable stop without reference to the officer's
subjective state of mind.

United States v. Robinson, 444 U.S.

218 (1973); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d| 704 (11th Cir.
1986); United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1976).
Defendant argued below that the stop was not
objectively reasonable because defendant is Hispanic and Officer
Mangelson admitted that he would ask to search vehicles driven by
Hispanics for contraband about 80% of the t^me and because
defendant claimed that he was not following too closely.
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First,

it should be noted that Mangelson also said that he would like to
search vehicles driven by Caucasians in 80% of his traffic stops
(T. 13). Second, while defendant claims that he was not
following too closely, his own testimony refuted that claim.
Defendant said he was travelling 54 miles per hour (T. 43, 46).
He also estimated that he was 85 to 95 feet behind the vehicle in
front of him (R. 52). The rule of thumb for a safe following
distance is one carlength or 20 feet for every 10 miles per hour
of speed (T. 27).

If defendant was 95 feet behind the nearest

vehicle, he was following at less than five carlengths behind
that vehicle.

Thus, even if defendant was travelling at 50 miles

per hour, he was following too closely.
It is also important that Mangelson did not determine
that defendant is Hispanic until after he turned across the
median and after he had decided to take enforcement action (T.
26-27, 31, 37, R. 51-52).

While the court found that Mangelson

stopped defendant on a pretext because he was "Latin" and had out
of state license plates, the court also found only that Mangelson
"may have" seen that the license was out of state prior to
turning around to apprehend defendant for the following too close
violation (R. 50), and the court found that Mangelson observed
defendant's ethnic appearance only after he had pulled alongside
defendant to estimate defendant's speed (R. 51-52).

Thus, even

though the court found that Mangelson wanted to stop Hispanics
and search their vehicles, the facts in this case do not support
the conclusion that Mangelson trumped up the traffic violation
merely as a pretext to an investigative search.
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Given that the conclusions reached by the lower court
were not a reasonable view of the facts that the court found and
were thus clearly erroneous, this Court should remand the case to
the lower court for entry of conclusions consistent with the
facts. .£££ Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191
(Utah 1987) (applying Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) tio a criminal case).
Furthermore, even if Mangelson did entertain the
thought that he would like to search defendartt's truck in the
moments between his observation that defendant was Hispanic and
the actual stop, those thoughts are not relevant to a
determination that the stop was valid, Robinson. 414 U.S. at 218.
Thus, the lower court's use of this information to invalidate an
otherwise lawful traffic stop was erroneous.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to reverse the decision of the lower court suppressing the
evidence either because the search was consensual or because the
facts do not support the conclusion that the search was
pretextual.
DATED this ^ 1

day of

/*'''A&*~-

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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1987.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of May, 1988, I

caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and exact copies
of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant to Walter F.
Bugden, Jr., 8 East 300 South #426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

jfi?: C : : ; J
IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
rafP.Greenwoc.C^1

ooOoo

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
:

v.

:

JOSE FRANCISCO ARROYO,

:

Defendant.

:
ooOoo

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Case }fo. 81-D
<

On December 7, 1987, the Defendant1$ Motion to Suppress
came on before this Court for an Evidentiary Hearing.

The

--~te was represented by its attorney, Dohald J. Eyre, Jr.,
the Defendant was present in person, £nd represented by
his counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr.

Highway Patrol Trooper

Paul Mangelson and the Defendant Jose Francisco Arroyo both
testified at this hearing.

After giving tareful consideration

to the testimony presented at the hearing^ the demeanor of the
witnesses on the witness stand, reviewing memoranda and case
law submitted to the Court by both counsel, and listening to
oral argument, this Court enters the following:

0^7

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 15, 1987, at approximately 4:00 p.m.

the Defendant, Jose Francisco Arroyo, was the driver of an
older model Ford Pick-up with a camper.

The vehicle was

headed in the northbound direction on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah.
2.

On the same date, and at the same time, Highway

Patrol Trooper Paul Mangelson was driving in a southbound
direction on 1-15 when he observed the truck driven by the
Defendant proceeding in a northbound direction.
3.

The Defendant testified he was driving in a group or

cluster of three cars, his vehicle being the third vehicle in
the group.

Trooper Mangelson testified that he only saw two

vehicles in the northbound direction and that the Defendant's
vehicle was the rear vehicle.
4.

y

<$#*?

Trooper Mangelson observed that the Defendant's

vehicle had out of state (California) license plates.
5.

In July of 1987, Trooper Mangelson attended a

seminar which focused upon the types of individuals who
transport controlled substances and the types of vehicles that
said controlled substances are transported in.
6.

Trooper Mangelson testified that by in large the

Utah Highway Patrol had found that most drug trafficing was
done by Colombians, Cubans, and Hispanics.
7.

Trooper Mangelson also testified that one of the

topics discussed at the seminar was the necessity for having a
reason to stop an automobile driven by a Colombian, Cuban, or
-2-

an Hispanic.

Trooper Mangelson understood that he could not

stop a vehicle just because the driver was of Latin origin.
8.

As a result Trooper Mangelson's training at this

seminar, he admitted that whenever he observed an Hispanic
individual driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the vehicle.
The Trooper also admitted that once he stepped an Hispanic
driver, 80% of the time he requested permission to search the
vehicle.
9.

Trooper ,Mapgej.gon estimated the Defendant's speed

was 50 miles per hour.

As the Trooper's vehicle passed the

Defendant's vehicle heading in opposite directions, the
Trooper testified that he believed the Defendant's vehicle was
three to four, maybe five cars lengths behind the vehicle
immediately in front of it.

Based on the Trooper's estimate

of the Defendant's speed, the Trooper testified that he
concluded that the Defendant was "Following too Close" to the
vehicle immediately in front of it.
10.

The Trooper then executed a U-turn through the

median and caught up with the Defendant's vehicle within a
half mile to a mile from the location of the initial
observation of the Defendant's vehicle.
11.

Upon overtaking the Defendant's vehicle the Trooper

testified that rather than pulling the Defendant over
immediately, he instead pulled up along side the Defendant's
vehicle in order to observe the occupants of je^e J)^endantf s
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12.
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Trooper Mangelson testified that the Defendants

vehicle was still three to four, maybe five cars lengths
behind the vehicle directly in front of it, and that this
distance was unsafe, and therefore the Defendant was
"Following too Close" in violation of the applicable traffic
code.
13.

When the Trooper pulled along side the Defendant's

vehicle, the Trooper did observe that the two occupants of the
Defendant's vehicle were of Latin origin.
14.

Under cross-examination, the Trooper denied that it

was his normal procedure when issuing a citation to an
individual for "Following too Close" to record the license
plate of the front car.

However, the Trooper's denial on this

point was contradicted by tape recorded testimony from the
Trooper at the preliminary hearing held in this matter.

The

Trooper admitted that he had not recorded the license plate
number of the front car in this case.
15.

The Defendant testified that he was at least 85 to

95 feet or nine car lengths, behind the vehicle immediately in
front of his own.

The Court finds this testimony to be

credible.
16.

In contrast, the Court is unpersuaded that Trooper

Mangelson rightfully determined that the Defendant was
"Following too Close" or that any other attested facts
preponderated to the level necessary to permit a
-4-

constitutional stop of the Defendant's vehicle.

Moreover, the

Court finds that the Trooper's own testimony established the
probability that no violation of law occurred, and that the
alleged violation was only a pretext asserted by the Trooper
to justify his stop of a vehicle with out of state license
plates and with occupants of Latin origin.
17.

The Trooper stopped the Defendant's vehicle for

allegedly "Following too Close".

Upon stopping the

Defendant's vehicle, he asked for and received identification
from the Defendant.

However, upon receiving this

identification, and learning from the Defendant that he had
only recently acquired the automobile, the Trooper did not run
a NCIC check on either the driver or the Defendant's vehicle
(to verify if the vehicle was stolen).

The Trooper denied

that running a NCIC check was standard police procedure.
18.

The Trooper requested permission to search the

Defendant's vehicle, and the Defendant consented to the search
of the vehicle.
19.

After searching the camper portion of the truck,

Trooper Mangelson detected that a package of some sort was
inside of the passengers's door.

After gaining access to the

inside panel of the passengers's door, Trooper Mangelson
removed three bundles containing approximately one kilogram of
a white powder wrapped in duct tape.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact of the Court now
enters the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A stop of an automobile can only be made upon

reasonable and articulable suspicion, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1986) or upon probable cause, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983).
2.

Trooper Mangel son lacked any reasonable, articulable

suspicion to stop the Defendant in the case at bar.

Instead,

the stop of the Defendant by Trooper Mangelson for allegedly
"Following too Close" was only a pretext utilized by the
Trooper to justify the stop of a vehicle with out of state
license plates and with occupants of Latin origin.

Pretext

stops are unconstitutional. State v. Mendoza, Slip opinion no.
20922 (Utah Dec. 1, 1987).
3.

The pretextural stop was employed by the Trooper to

conceal his genuine investigative purpose.

Because the stop

of the Defendant in the case at bar was unsupported by either
articulable suspicion or probable cause, the Defendant was
unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.
4.

All evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's

unlawful detention must be suppressed.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court now enters its:
ORDER
The stop that lead to the consensual search and seizure
was a pretext stop and an unconstitutional violation of the
-6-

Defendant's right to be free from unreasonlable searches
seizures under the Fourth Amendment of thel United States
Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

All evidence procured as a result of the

unlawful stop of the Defendant is therefore suppressed.
DATED this

C/jtouiay

of

Approved
form:
approved as tr
fb
o f(
DONALD J. EYKE,/0R7T
Juab County Attorney
I
i
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BUGDEN. JR. —
LARRY
A. H O W A R D L U N D G R E N
257 TOWERS. SUITE 340
257 EAST 200 SOUTH — 1 0
S A L T LAKK CITY. UTAH

R.

KELLER

84111

TELEPHONE (801) 532-7282

December 16, 1988

Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE:

State of Utah v. Jose Francisco Arroyo
Case No. 880062-CA

Attention:

Julie Whitfield, Case Manager

Dear Julie:
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Pursuant to Utah Court of Appeals Rule 24(j), please be
advised that in addition to the cases which the Appellant
has
cited in his brief, he intends to rely upon S^at:o~~iFFJ58fltt, 94 Utah
Adv.RepJ(-3d (filed November 1, 1988) at oral argument in the
above-entitled matter. This supplemental citation pertains to
pages 4 through 9 of the Appellant's brief, and further supports
the arguments made therein.
Thank you for your attention.
Yours truly,

WFB/edp
cc: Sandra L. Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General

